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1 Introduction
With the collapse of the Soviet empire in 1991 and
the concurrent collapse of the traditional supply
and distribution channels across the former Soviet
Union (FSU), the major challenge seen to be con-
fronting the transition economies in the early tian-
sitionary period was the need to establish a stable
macro-economic environment and to liberalise
trade and prices. This, it was assumed, would set
the framework within which economic activity
could proceed at a favourable rate and enterprises
would respond (in some mysterious way, automat-
ically) to the changes. While considerable progress
has been made in macro-economic stabilisation
and liberalisation, this has been accompanied by
growing rates of unemployment, social distress and
political upheaval as well as a sharp decline in out-
put.
Efforts to promote restructuring and growth of the
productive sector need to be underpinned by a
sound understanding of the situation at the enter-
prise level. This article aims to contribute to this
understanding through the use of a case-study
approach. Two cases are considered: the first is an
industrial enterprise set up in the Soviet era and
recently privatised ('inherited firm' hereafter); the
second is a new firm set up at the outset of the tran-
sition era ('new firm' hereafter). The case studies
indicate that while some of the market-adjustment
problems encountered by industrial enterprises in
transition economies are similar to those encoun-
tered by enterprises in developing and indeed in
developed countries, enterprises in a transition
economy like Kazakstan are concurrently strug-
gling with the legacy of central planning and as
such face a distinct set of challenges requiring a
distinct set of policies.
The article begins by setting out the main elements
of the external environment relevant to industrial
enterprises in Kazakstan. This is followed by a
description of the two firms. The final section takes
stock of the lessons to be learned from these case
studies and their implications for future research
Special thanks are due to Raphie Kaplinsky, whose
unflagging enthusiasm for industrial restructuring,
especially at minus 34CC with wind-chill, will remain a
continuous source of inspiration. All errors and
misinterpretations are the authors' own.
on, and policy for enterprise restructuring and
development in transition economies like
Kazakstan.
2 The context for enterprise
development and restructuring
Since gaining its independence in 1991, Kazakstan
has embarked on far-reaching economic reforms.
The initial transition years were dominated by
Lfforts to manage the negative repercussions of the
collapse of the socialist system. In this context, the
ocus was on privatisation of assets, liberalisation of
riarkets and the creation of a stable macro-eco-
iomic environment. After an initial period of high
macro-economic instability, a number of critical
areas of macro-economic management and market
tiberalisation were addressed successfully: inflation
was reduced from just under 2,000 per cent in
1994 to approximately 25 per cent in 1997; follow-
ng the introduction of the national currency in
1993, a relatively stable exchange rate was
obtained; almost all prices were liberalised by the
end of 1994; and a liberal trade regime was intro-
duced (EBRD 1997: 179).
The costs of this adjustment have, however, been
high. In addition to growing rates of unemploy-
ment, social distress, income disparities and politi-
cal upheavals, the economy experienced sharp falls
in output. As shown in Table 1, until recently, this
decline was more pronounced in Kazakstan than in
most other transition economies. In recent years,
the economic situation has improved and
Kazakstan has experienced economic growth, albeit
modest.
Table 1: Growth in real GDP in Eastern Europe, the Baltics and the CIS (per cent)
Source: EBRO 1997: 115
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However, a number of problems beset the external
environment of enterprises in Kazakstan:
In the evolving agenda the underlying attempts
to reform the enterprise sector have almost
exclusively been seen in terms of financial reha-
bilitation. Enduring growth in productivity and
output can, however, only be attained if these
are accompanied by changes in strategic focus,
organisation and production methods.
If enterprises are to break their reliance on gov-
ernment and to secure finance for restructuring
or new business ventures, open access to sound
financial and capital markets is needed. The
financial sector in Kazakstan is marked by high
fluctuations. In the middle of 1993 there were
210 banks in Kazakstan; by 1997 this number
had reduced to less than 100. The volatility of
the banking system, coupled with high real
interest rates of some 30 per cent and undercap-
italisation of banks, makes it virtually impossible
for enterprises to borrow capital economically
(EBRD 1997: 179).
As an extensive study of Kazakstani inherited
and new enterprises showed, there is a need for
assistance in facilitating enterprise restructuring.
While Kazakstan continues to enjoy a high edu-
cational base (over 90 per cent of the population
are literate and have completed secondary
school education), there is a severe lack of skills
and experiences required for domestically based
enterprise restructuring and development (Tacis
1996).
The legal and institutional infrastructure
required for growth of a market-driven enter-
prise sector is weak. Notably bankruptcy laws
and competition policies remain underdevel-
oped or are altogether absent, leading to
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
estimate
1997
pmjection
Eastern Europe and
Baltic States
-10.6 -4.2 0.4 3.7 5.3 4.1 3.1
CIS -5.8 -14.3 -9.3 -13.5 -4.9 -4.6 0.8
Kazakstan -13.0 -12.9 -10.4 -17.8 -8.9 1.1 2.0
Table 2: Industrial production of selected sectors in Kazakstan
Source: World Bank 1995: 262
problems such as unprofitable businesses con-
tinuing to operate and strong enterprises impos-
ing entry and exit restrictions in key sectors.
Corruption at all levels of business is a severe
problem. The EBRD estimates Kazakstan to be
one of the most corrupt countries in the FSU
(EBRD 1997).
3 The case studies
Having sketched out the background against which
enterprises operate in Kazakstan, the article now
turns to examining two industrial enterprises in
Kazakstan. The first is an inherited firm which is
struggling with survival and the second is a new
enterprise which has experienced considerable suc-
cess2. The two cases are first examined separately
before they are compared and contrasted. Lessons
to be drawn from these case studies are examined in
the concluding part of the paper.
Survival of the fittest: case study of an
enterprises restructuring efforts
The first enterprise in question is a clothing pro-
ducer established in the 1960s3. lt was established
as one of three clothing producers in Kazakstan
exploiting cotton produced as a result of the cotton
mono-culture policy in Central Asia. During the
Soviet era, the enterprise held a more than 50 per
cent share of the market in Kazakstan. lt had an
extensive distribution network, comprising some
50 wholesalers throughout Kazakstan and neigh-
bouring republics. The company developed a well
recognised and strong brand name during Soviet
times. It employed some 2,000 people.
Both are located in the south of Kazakstan and within
close proximity of large commercial centres. They are
also within close proximity of the border of populous
Unbekistan.
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Since the onset of transition, this enterprise has
been confronted with many of the problems typical
of a Soviet enterprise. As shown in Table 2, the
clothing sector experienced a severe fall in output,
falling by more than 80 per cent from 1990 to
1993.
The economic downturn, combined with the open-
ing of trade (resulting in c heap imports flooding
the markets, mainly from Turkey, China and
Thailand), had an immediate impact on the cloth-
ing enterprise in question. The enterprise experi-
enced a sharp decline in sales. Since 1993, the
company has been at a near standstill, producing at
a maximum of 10 per cent of its capacity
Following this decline, the enterprise followed a
path common to inherited industrial enterprises in
less developed transition economies: inertia was
coupled with efforts to maintain production
through barter trade. The enterprise managers'
main aim was to maintain the status quo, in particu-
lar with regard to its employees. While this is a
problem in many other countries and economic
systems, this is particularly strong in former social-
ist economies where full employment was a fact of
life for over 70 years and where a social wage,
which included access to housing, energy, schooling
and medical care, was linked directly to
employment. Managers also inherited the Soviet
culture of measuring an enterprise's status (and that
of its managers) by the number of workers and the
volume of output, not the value of output or profit.
Thus, when the enterprise was privatised in 1993
This enterprise was visited by T. Azad at the end of
1995 in the framework of a countrywide cross-sectoral
analysis of Kazakstani enterprises (EES 1996).
Sector Percentage change over
previous year
Cumulative per-
centage change
1991 1992 1993 1991-93
Clothing 15.5 -22.0 -80.2 -82.2
Light industry 2.5 -21.0 -70.2 -75.9
All industry -0.9 -13.8 -27.4 38.0
and 95 per cent of the shares were transferred to the
employees and management of the enterprise, little
actual change was introduced. The managers' lack
of experience with market-oriented business prac-
t ices as well as their historic links to the enterprise
and in particular its employees meant that enlo-
tonal ties precluded reorganisation for more effi-
tient and productive (labour) resource allocation.
This is exemplified by the fact that despite the
decline in sales, the company still had some 1,900
people on its payroll at the end of 1995. It should
be noted that in the context of Kazakstan, this does
not mean that people on the payroll were working
at or being paid by the enterprise. When the corn-
any was visited in December 1995, none of its
.'mployees had been paid since August and most
cmployees were working elsewhere, mostly selling
croducts on the market. Nonetheless, the employ-
ces, as in many inherited enterprises, stayed on the
company's payroll to have access to the social wage
and because of the social stigma attached to being
unemployed.
The enterprise continued its existence on the basis
of minimal production, designated for barter trade.
By the end of 1995, some 75 per cent of all trans-
actions were on a barter trade basis4. For example,
at the time the enterprise was visited, it purchased
cotton, the main input, from neighbouring
Uzbekistan. However, as it could not afford the
transport costs, it entered into a barter arrangement
with the national railway company whereby uni-
forms were produced for the railway company in
return for the cotton being transported to the enter-
prise by rail. This barter trade enabled the company
to continue producing, thereby avoiding closure.
Despite the dire situation at the enterprise at the
end of 1995, it can be considered potentially viable,
though it currently lacks a credible strategy and
needs to make major changes. The enterprise's
technical know-how to produce good-quality cloth-
ing as well as a strong local brand name would be
valuable assets when allied to an appropriate
Barter trade, typically bilateral, has become a prevalent
method of exchange in industry in many transition
economies. Once started, barter trading becomes a
vicious circle, leading to debts, taxes and wages settled
with payment-in-kind or through mutual write-offs.
Therefore, enterprises become more dependent on each
other due to their simultaneous supplier-customer
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strategy notably setting up reliable distribution
channels, upgrading retail marketing and updating
designs. While an injection of capital will be neces-
sary for the implementation of the strategy such a
capital injection must be complemented by a focus
on management and organisational methods. The
risk of the investment being utilised to cover oper-
ating losses, or for inappropriate purchases of
equipment, would need to be averted by underpin-
ning the restructuring efforts with a strong strategic
focus. There is a tendency for inherited enterprises
in the FSU to attribute all problems to outdated
technology thus viewing all solutions in terms of
technology
A successful enterprise-level effort
The article now turns to the second case study
which is a new enterprise founded in 1990 as a pri-
vate family-run business. At the outset, the enter-
prise produced one beauty-care product on the
family's private premises. By early 1997, the com-
pany was producing four types of beauty-care prod-
ucts and the initial number of five employees, all
family members, had increased to about 450.
Since the outset, most of the inputs required for the
production, packaging and labelling were sourced
from well known, mainly European, suppliers.
Most inputs have been and are continued to be
sourced from abroad because local suppliers either
do not exist or do not meet the company's quality
and delivery requirements.
The enterprise operates in a sector which is domi-
nated by global brands of multinational corpora-
tions (MNCs) and by Russian brands. There are
virtually no other local brands. Thus, the com-
pany's competition is mainly against global brands.
In 1997, the company held 6 to 10 per cent of the
domestic market.
As shown in Table 3, from 1991 to 1993 the com-
pany enjoyed a steep increase in sales because of:
(a) the company's price competitiveness: its
relations. lt is notable that barter trade was prohibited
in Kazakstan in 1995. However, it is stilt common
practice, especially for inherited enterprises. For more
on causes of barter trade and policies to promote non-
barter sales in transition economies, see Marin and
Schnitzer (t995).
Table 3: Changes in company's average annual sales volumes (per cent change over previous year)
products were sold for two to three times less than
global brands; (b) access to Central Asian import
markets, which were still closed to outside trade
and thus local enterprises could benefit from the
protectionism; and (c) good contacts with the
administration. However, the situation changed in
1994 when the company experienced a 40 per cent
fall in sales. This was caused by the loss of one of its
key markets (neighbouring Uzbekistan, which lib-
eralised imports in that year) and by trade liberali-
sation in Kazakstan, which increased the inflow of
competing foreign goods.
In response to this dramatic decline in sales, the
company started a competitiveness strategy which
the authors believe constitutes the key to its success
today This strategy was constituted by: (a) devising
and implementing a restructuring plan using exter-
nal finance; (b) retraining the staff; and (c) under-
taking market research and consequently
responding to market signals.
With the onset of the enterprise's crisis, two exter-
nal consultants, retired Western executives working
as volunteers for an aid programme, were drawn in
by the company's management. While the use of
outside experts is a common practice in European
and American enterprises, it is a new approach to
problem solving at the enterprise level in economies
in transition, thus reflecting the management's for-
ward thinking.
Research by the first consultant revealed that a key
reason for the decline was the significantly poorer
design and packaging of the products in compari-
son to its competitors. In response to this needs
identification, the consultant and the enterprise's
management submitted a restructuring plan and
secured a loan from an international lending agency
In view of the limited sources and supply of project
finance in Kazakstan, it can safely be assumed that
close contact with the administration was influen-
tial in securing this loan. The loan was used for the
purchase of packaging and labelling equipment and
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a greenfield site. In 1996, the company constructed
its new production, storage and administration
facilities and bought packaging equipment from
Europe. Following research into international pack-
aging standards and designs, the company used its
new packaging facilities for the first time in
November 1996. The new packaging had an imme-
diate impact on the company's sales.
A second consultant, a marketing professional spe-
cialising in beauty care, was drawn in to upgrade
the company's strategïc marketing and management
skills. The consultant carried out practical on-the-
job training on strategic management, market
research and marketing.
The third aspect of the competitiveness strategy lay
in efforts to understand the needs and wants of the
consumers through market research. In response to
this research, efforts were undertaken to develop
new products, through in-house research and
development, to meet customers' changing expecta-
tions and to diversify the product range. New prod-
ucts, targeting different segments of the market and
reflecting consumers' demands for more naturally-
based ingredients, were successfully introduced.
This three-pronged restructuring strategy had an
immediate impact on the enterprise's growth. In the
first three months of 1997, the company's sales
increased by 32 per cent versus the previous year.
In addition, its market share increased by almost 30
per cent. The enterprise planned to maintain this
level of growth by expanding within the Central
Asia region and other neighbouring countries,
notably Russia.
In conclusion, this firm can be considered a success
as a result of its ability to respond to the changing
market conditions, that is fluctuations in the market
size and competitive pressure, changing consumer
demands, and the need for appropriately skilled
management. These strategies were all imple-
mented in connection with the capital injection.
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
(approx.) (approx.)
Sales volume (% change) 140 39 -40 9 0.6 74
While this capital injection was vital to the
company's growth, the company's strategic use of it
was of equal or greater importance.
4 Determinants of differences:
comparing apples and oranges?
Having examined the two cases separately, the arti-
cle turns to drawing out the determinants of the dif-
lerences between these two companies. However,
prior to outlining the factors determining the differ-
ences between the two producers, the comparabil-
ity of the two companies needs to be analysed. Both
enterprises produce consumer goods; one is satisfy-
ing basic needs (low-cost clothing) while the other
(beauty care) is aiming to satisfy consumer desires
beyond basic needs.
With respect to their labour markets, neither com-
pany faces organised trade unions and both have
access to the skills required for the production
processes. However, the skills required in the pro-
duction of beauty care are significantly less than
those required by clothing production. It is not
believed that the differences in availability of skills
for the two companies had a significant effect on
their differences in performance.
A serious difference between the two companies lies
in their approach to both supplies and sales. Both
enterprises faced difficulties in sourcing their
inputs: the clothing producer because of a collapse
of the Soviet supply chain and the beauty-care pro-
ducer because of the volatile trade structure. The
beauty-care producer purchased all raw materials
from Europe, while the clothing producer sourced
all inputs locally and from neighbouring
Uzbekistan, on barter terms. Its output was also
sold through barter, which requires more complex
arrangements. The company's sales were in the
ESU, and these channels have largely become
redundant. However, the new enterprise was able to
develop viable marketing channels, although it paid
high prices for the imported inputs. Thus both
faced distinct sets of difficulties which cannot be
easily measured against each other.
Two factors in particular had a significant impact on
the comparative success of the new enterprise over
the old enterprise. Firstly, the clothing producer's
Lnertia and reactive business approach is a reflection
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of the vigorous repression of entrepreneurship
under Soviet rule. In contrast, the management of
the new enterprise was not weighed down by the
burden of an inherited anti-entrepreneurial spirit.
Secondly, the beauty-care producer was well
enough connected to be able to import raw materi-
als when Kazakstan still had a closed economy, giv-
ing it a competitive edge over other local producers.
Its exploitation of opportunities offered in this way
would, in some cultures, be considered
entrepreneurial.
5 Conclusions
The external environment for enterprises in
Kazakstan has improved since the early 1990s and
enterprises can now develop against a backdrop of
relative macro-economic stability. However, the
framework for market-oriented enterprise develop-
ment and restructuring, in particular the legal, insti-
tutional and financial infrastructure, remains weak.
In the present article two cases of enterprise restruc-
turing in Kazakstan were analysed in pursuit of
highlighting some of the conditions determining
the ability of enterprises in a transition economy
like Kazakstan to respond to the transition and to
develop.
Two enterprises were examined. The first is charac-
teristic of inherited enterprises. It faced immense
difficulties in coping with the legacy of the past, in
particular the management's lack of skills and expe-
rience with the market economy Although the
enterprise managed to survive, the sustainability of
this approach is questionable and the need for a
change of strategy is evident. The new enterprise
can be considered representative of the (few) suc-
cessful enterprises in Kazakstan. Its success was
largely based on getting many of the basic elements
of business right and benefiting from privileges
through which it could protect itself.
The two case studies raise a number of interesting
questions for future policy and research. At the
moment, enterprises seeking finance are, on the
whole, unable to borrow economically at local
banks and must therefore resort to foreign sources
of financing which are sparse and generally finance
larger projects. There is, therefore, a need for low-
cost financing for enterprises wishing to restructure
and devising a strategy to that end. However, this
needs to be coupled with assistance to entrepre-
neurs in developing and implementing a strategic
plan for the enterprise. There could be a role for
government to promote the development of advi-
sors in enterprise restructuring and development.
With respect to future research, further case-study
research needs to be undertaken, in view of the lack
of reliable data from Kazakstan and the limited
understanding of the situation within enterprises.
Case-study analysis is a useful and necessary way of
highlighting similarities and differences. Such
research would provide important and substantive
background information for comparative analyses
on the basis of which government policy and policy
advice to Kazakstan and the region can be devised.
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